

Topic 14:

DBMS Security

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A Few DBMS Security Issues

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Issue #1: Availability

Two goals that often conflict:

- Making authorized access easy
- Making unauthorized access hard

Two categories of access controls:

DAC Features of SQL (1 / 4)

Views are a very basic form of DAC:

- Gives users access to necessary information
- Completely hides origins of values

- Is a form of ‘security by obscurity’

DAC Features of SQL (2 / 4)

Options to the CREATE USER command:

Form: `CREATE USER <username> [<option(s)>];`

Typical options include:

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DAC Features of SQL (3 / 4)

Providing privileges with the GRANT command:

Form: `GRANT <privilege>
[ON <object>]
TO <user>
[WITH GRANT OPTION];`

Example(s):

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DAC Features of SQL (4 / 4)

What can be GRANTED may be REVOKEd:

```
Form:  REVOKE <privilege>
       [ ON <object> ]
       FROM <user>;
```

Example(s):

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Mandatory Access Controls (1 / 3)

Idea: The DBMS has default security procedures that must be followed.

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Mandatory Access Controls (2 / 3)

Example: The Bell–LaPadula Model (1974)

Security classes are applied to two groups:

Mandatory Access Controls (3 / 3)

Bell-Lapadula enforces two restrictions on security classes
(class) assigned to a subject (S) and an object (O):

Issue #2: Confidentiality

To help maintain confidentiality, we can require:

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A Special Case: Statistical DBMS Security

Restriction: Users may ask aggregate queries only

Example(s):

Example(s):

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Issue #3: Integrity

Idea: Be able to recover DBs after accident or disaster

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Some Standard Oracle Security Features
















These are available by default in recent versions of Oracle:

- User authentication
- User privileges and roles
- Virtual Private DBs (via query modification)
- Classification of fields
- Network data encryption (via PL/SQL's DBMS_CRYPT0)
- Digital certificate authentication
- Database auditing

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A Common DBMS Attack: SQL Injection (1 / 5)

A portion of the roster of teams registered for the 2009 ACM North Central Programming Contest at Lincoln, NE:

Kansas State University	 United States	Team K-State	ACCEPTED
Kansas State University	 United States	Wildcat hijack	ACCEPTED
Mount Marty College	 United States	Mount Marty College Lancers	ACCEPTED
Nebraska Wesleyan University	 United States	Epik High	ACCEPTED
South Dakota State University	 United States	2+2	ACCEPTED
South Dakota State University	 United States	Never Gonna Let You Down	ACCEPTED
Southwest Minnesota State University	 United States	Mustang 1	ACCEPTED
Southwest Minnesota State University	 United States	Mustang 2	ACCEPTED
University of Nebraska - Lincoln	 United States	'; DROP TABLE TEAMS;	ACCEPTED
University of Nebraska - Lincoln	 United States	Audrey II	ACCEPTED
University of Nebraska - Lincoln	 United States	Estrogen Attack	ACCEPTED
University of Nebraska - Lincoln	 United States	Incendiary Pigs	ACCEPTED
University of Nebraska - Lincoln	 United States	Phelpsian Øt	ACCEPTED
University of Nebraska - Lincoln	 United States	Smiley Faces :)	ACCEPTED
University of Nebraska - Lincoln	 United States	ThreadDeath	ACCEPTED
University of Nebraska - Omaha	 United States	Team Damage	ACCEPTED

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A Common DBMS Attack: SQL Injection (2 / 5)

The attack:

A user tries to add (inject) SQL into an incomplete query, in hopes of getting the DBMS to reveal additional information.

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A Common DBMS Attack: SQL Injection (3 / 5)

Example(s):

Consider this dynamically–constructed SQL query:

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A Common DBMS Attack: SQL Injection (4 / 5)

Example(s): (continued)

But what if the user types this input?

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A Common DBMS Attack: SQL Injection (5 / 5)

Preventing Injection Attacks: